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Abstract The present paper analyses the consequences of groundwater exploitation by
using field-level data collected from two distinct well irrigated areas of Karnataka. The
study results show that the consequences arising out of groundwater overexploitation are
severe in high well interference area compared to low well interference area. The burden of
well failure is more or less equally shared by all categories of farmers but small farmers are
the worst victims of resource scarcity. As a result, overexploitation of groundwater has
different impacts on different categories of farmers in terms of access to groundwater, cost
and returns to groundwater irrigation and its negative externality cost. The study suggests
maintaining inter-well distance to prevent resource mining and calls for supply and
demand side interventions. The institutional reform is necessary to restore surface water
bodies to facilitate aquifer recharge.
Keywords Farming community  Groundwater  Hard rock areas  Irrigation 
Overexploitation
1 Introduction
An impressive development that has taken place in Indian agriculture, since independence,
is the swift expansion of groundwater irrigation. Over the last 60 years, Indian farmers
have pumped massive investment into groundwater structures, which is estimated to be in
order of US$ 12 billion (Shah 1993, 2007). The ultimate irrigation potential from
groundwater source is 64.05 million ha, as compared to 46 million ha of land currently
under groundwater irrigation (Government of Karnataka 2005). Groundwater meets nearly
55 per cent of irrigation, 85 per cent of rural and 50 per cent of urban industrial needs
(Government of India 2007) and up to 80 per cent of the country’s total agricultural
production may, in one form or another, be dependent on groundwater (Dains and Pawar
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1987). The gross irrigated area in India in 1960–1961 was 28 million ha, and in
1998–1999, it moved up by 76 million ha with a sharp Compounded Annual Growth Rate
(CAGR) of 2.2 per cent (Scott et al. 2003). It is evident from the data that the tanks
recoded a reduced growth rate by 1.1 per cent, whereas much of the growth is accounted
by groundwater (Government of India 2007).
India withdraws an estimated 231 billion cubic metre of water from the ground annu-
ally, the largest amount in the world. Considering that groundwater is a critical input for
livelihoods, irrigating about 70 per cent of the cropped area and supplying 80 per cent of
domestic water, it is clear that the economy is approaching a flashpoint (EPW 2007).
Groundwater overexploitation has been recognized as a serious problem in India since the
late 1980s (Moench 1992; Dhawan 1988, 1995; Macdonald et al. 1995; Bhatia 1992;
Chandrakanth and Arun 1997; Shivakumaraswamy and Chandrakanth 1997; Reddy 2005;
Palanisami et al. 2008), and the rate of extraction of groundwater far exceeds the rate of
replenishment in many blocks leading to progressive lowering of the water table (Deb Roy
and Shah 2003; Government of India 2007).
Groundwater development helped farmers use more intensive production techniques
that required higher inputs and associated capital investments (Moench 2003). Globally,
agricultural groundwater use of around 900 km3 a year supports an annual output valued at
$210–$230 billions, yielding a gross productivity of about $0.23–$0.26 per cubic metre of
water abstracted (Molden 2007:396). In Asia, groundwater irrigation contributes about
US$10–12 billion business per year, and if we consider farmer’s earnings from selling
groundwater for irrigation, the contribution may goes up nearly US$ 25–30 billion per year
(Shah 1993, 2007). On the other hand, groundwater also proven to enhance the wage rate
and employment opportunities for agricultural labourers as well as reducing rural poverty
(Shah and Raju 1987; Shah 1993; Narayanamoorthy and Deshpande 2003). While past
studies have highlighted the positive benefits of groundwater irrigation, the recent studies
have been focusing on the issues of costs of groundwater irrigation, overexploitation,
externalities, etc. (Janakarajan 1993; Nagaraj et al. 1994; Vaidyanathan 1996; Chandrak-
anth and Arun 1997; Shivakumaraswamy and Chandrakanth 1997; Nagaraj 1994; Reddy
2005; Janakarajan and Moench 2006; Anantha 2009; Anantha and Raju 2008, 2010;
Palanisami et al. 2008). A major portion of India’s irrigation wells is located in the hard
rock areas where both recharge and discharge potential presently face severe stress
(Nagaraj and Chandrakanth 1995). Therefore, assessing the impacts of groundwater irri-
gation in the context of overexploitation assumes greater importance in taking measures to
sustain the resource for future generation. This paper is an attempt to understand the effects
of declining groundwater resource in the hard rock areas of Karnataka, India.
2 Materials and methods
The central dry zone is one of the hard rock areas that lie in the central part of Karnataka.
The zone consists of 17 taluks covering a total geographical area of 20,112.81 sq. km. The
rainfall ranges between 455.5 and 717.4 mm in the zone. Agriculture is the major occu-
pation with about 60 % of the working population cultivating land. In these areas, the
cropping pattern is governed by access to groundwater in the absence of major surface
irrigation schemes. A wide range of crops are grown in the study areas. In kharif season,
the farmers grow paddy, ragi, maize and vegetables for regular income. Perennial cash
crops such as coconut and arecanut comprise of large areas and short-term cash crops such
as groundnut is also present in the system. A very limited amount of land is allocated to
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summer paddy owing to water scarcity problem. It is important to note that cash crops have
a major share in the gross irrigated area, especially in Hosadurga.
Using the index of cumulative well interference (ICWI), two taluks—Madhugiri and
Hosadurga with index value of 2.6 and 1.5, respectively—were selected for a detailed
analysis based on the magnitude of the problem of cumulative well interference. Cumu-
lative well interference refers to the total effect of over-pumping of groundwater from
several wells resulting in reduction in the yield and water level in the surrounding wells
(Shivakumaraswamy and Chandrakanth 1997:1).The selected taluks are in the low well
interference area, Hosadurga, and high well interference area, Madhugiri.
Using the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) method, the number of wells (both
functional and non-functional), the depth of the wells, approximate distance between the
wells, size of the farms and farmers names were mapped in each village. The PRA method
was helpful in locating irrigation wells in relation to cumulative well interference. Using
the PRA map, a sample of 225 farmers who had irrigation wells that were densely placed
was drawn from nine villages in two taluks. The information gathered includes the
socioeconomic profile, details of irrigation wells, access to groundwater irrigation, details
about agricultural inputs and outputs and so on. Outputs are based on harvest figures
reported in kilograms or quintals by farmers and converted to weight measures. The
primary survey was carried out during September to December 2007. According to data
obtained from Department of Mines and Geology (DMG) and Central Ground Water Board
(CGWB) (GoK 2005), Hosadurga is less affected by the problem of cumulative well
interference. Therefore, we considered Hosadurga for comparison with Madhugiri. The
estimation methods and relevant concepts are explained below.
2.1 Annual cost of irrigation
The annual cost of irrigation was estimated by amortizing the capital cost on well
investment. The annual irrigation cost was arrived at by adding the amortized cost of
irrigation wells, amortized cost of conveyance structures, annual repairs and maintenance
costs on the farm.
The amortized cost of irrigation is the sum of amortized investment on all wells on the
farm, pump sets and accessories, conveyance structures, overground storage structure and
annual repairs and maintenance cost of all wells. In this study, as in other studies, a
discount rate of 2 % was used in amortization, reflecting long-term sustainable rate
(Chandrakanth et al. 1998a, b, c, 2004). The capital cost of the well was amortized over its
entire life span. An interest rate of 2 % represented the rate of inflation in the cost of well
components like labour, pump sets and other accessories.
The amortized investment on each well was estimated with the help of following
formula:
Amortised investment on well ¼ ðCIÞ  ð1 þ iÞAL  i
h i
= ð1 þ iÞAL  1
h i
ð1Þ
CI ¼ ðIIÞ  1 þ ið ÞðdcdiÞ ð2Þ
II = initial investment on well, dc = year of data collection (2007), di = year of drilling
irrigation well, AL = average life of wells, i = interest rate, CI = compounded investment.
Amortized cost of borewell ¼ ½ðCompounded cost of borewellÞ
 1 þ ið ÞAL iÞ=½ 1 þ ið ÞAL1 ð3Þ
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Compounded cost of borewell ¼ BWcostð Þ  1 þ ið Þð2007year of drillingÞ ð4Þ
Amortized cost of pump set and accessories ¼ f½ðcompounded cost of pump set
þ compounded cost of pump houseÞ
 1 þ ið ÞAL i=½ 1 þ ið ÞAL1g
ð5Þ
Amortized cost of conveyance ¼ f½ðCompounded cost of conveyance pipe usedÞ
 1 þ ið ÞAL iÞ= 1 þ ið ÞAL1g ð6Þ
2.2 Average life of well
Average life of well ¼
Xn
i¼1
ðfiÞðxiÞ 
Xn
i¼1
ðfiÞ over i ð7Þ
where f = frequency of wells worked, x = age of well (1, 2, 3, 4….n), i = ranges from
zero to n, where n refers to the longest age of well in the group.
2.3 Access to groundwater
Access to groundwater was measured in terms of physical and economic access. Physical
access to groundwater was related to resource yield, which depends on the depth of the
wells and availability of water. Economic access to groundwater is related to its cost of
extraction. Physical access to groundwater can be measured in terms of the number of
wells, depth and yield levels, whereas economic access is determined by cost per acre-inch
of water extraction and area irrigated (Chandrakanth et al. 2004).
2.3.1 Physical access
Physical access was analysed by regressing groundwater used per acre of gross irrigated
area as a function of average well depth, well yield and amortized cost per acre-inch of
groundwater. It was hypothesized that physical access to groundwater varied directly with
well depth, well yield and inversely with amortized cost of groundwater per acre-inch in
the log-linear relation:
ln wu ¼ ln a þ b1 ln wd þ b2 ln wy þ b3 ln cw ð8Þ
where wu = Water used per acre of gross area irrigated, wd = Well depth (ft),
wy = Water yield (gallons per hour), cw = Cost of water (Rupees per acre-inch of water).
2.3.2 Economic access
The economic access to groundwater was measured by amortized cost of groundwater per
acre-inch and hypothesized to vary inversely with well depth, water yield from the well
and gross irrigated area. The economic access to groundwater was regressed on well depth
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(ft), water yield for the well (in gallons per hour) and gross irrigated area (in acres). The
estimated function in log-linear form is as follows:
ln cw ¼ ln a þ b1 ln wd þ b2 ln wy þ b3 ln gia ð9Þ
where cw = amortized cost of groundwater (Rs per acre-inch), wd = well depth (ft),
wy = groundwater yield from the well (gallons per hour), gia = gross irrigated area (in
acres).
2.4 Negative externality
The annual negative externality cost of irrigation wells was estimated as the difference
between the amortized cost per well and the amortized cost per functioning well. This can
be written as follows:
NEC ¼ ACPW  ACFW ð10Þ
where, NEC = negative externality cost, ACPW = amortized cost per well,
ACFW = amortized cost per functioning well.
The difference between ACPW and ACFW was considered as the externality cost due to
the following reasons:
1. in hard rock areas, due to rapidly declining groundwater levels, the average age and
life of wells both are falling
2. if all wells on the farm are functioning, then there will be no externality
3. if the failure rate of wells is high, then the difference between the amortized cost per
well and that of working well would also be high as the cost of well failure due to
interference would be apparent and hence the externality cost. Thus, the amortized
cost per well minus amortized cost per functioning well gives the negative externality
or the social cost per well faced by farmer.
3 Results and discussion
3.1 Ownership of groundwater structures
Landholding size seems to be a major factor for owning different types of groundwater
structures. Table 1 demonstrated that as the landholding size increases the preference to
have borewell technology increases in Hosadurga, where the proportion of borewells is in
increasing trend as we move towards larger landholding sizes. The ownership of different
types of groundwater structures in Madhugiri gives a different picture as well interference
problem is severe. Evidently, the groundwater structures owned by small farmers in
Madhugiri are due to the reason that a majority of them are late comers in the resource
extraction activity. In this situation, small and marginal farmers are unable to strike water
as this area is already suffering from acute well interference problem. In the course of
competition, even if they are able to mop the capital required for additional wells, they
would have to bear greater risk of not striking adequate groundwater in this area.
The burden of groundwater overexploitation in terms of failed wells is equally dis-
tributed among all categories of farmers in Madhugiri (Table 1). The open wells are the
first causality of overexploitation of groundwater. This has been evidenced clearly from
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our survey data. The causality of groundwater overexploitation in terms of defunct wells is
highest in both the areas irrespective of the degree of well interference problem (Table 1).
Therefore, none of the open wells and DCBW is functional. At the surface, it appears that
the numbers of wells are high, but it is not so in terms of functioning wells. After the open
wells become dry, the concern of the farmers shifts to restoration of well irrigation at any
cost. Oblivious to the risk involved, farmers incur heavy expenditure on drilling borewells,
most of them making repeated attempts. Even in respect of successful borewells, many
farmers have had to incur expenditure in deepening borewells, because the borewells
which succeeded initially were dry after running for a few years. This process has led to
owning more number of wells to sustain crops.
In the study area, the ownership rights over groundwater structures viz., borewells and
open wells are enjoyed by a sole owner, but not by joint well owners. This is of funda-
mental importance in the understanding of emerging groundwater problems and potential
solutions, because it has become a central point of overexploitation. It accelerates the rate
of extraction of groundwater as they enjoy the ownership rights as well as freedom to
extract groundwater as and when required. The survey conducted in 9 villages show that
about one-third of large farmers owned nearly 50 % of wells in Hosadurga (Table 2).
Similarly, in Madhugiri, the maximum number of wells owned by small farmers is an
indication of high well failure due to the problem of resource mining by large farmers.
Janakarajan and Moench (2006) revealed that larger the land area owned, greater was
the possibility of striking groundwater. In this respect, the scope of sustaining groundwater
irrigation is far better for large land owners compared to small holders. But it is difficult to
predict for how long they will sustain in the course of competitive deepening. In this
context, it is important to note that while the threat of getting eliminated from the race of
competitive deepening is seemingly just around the corner for the resource-poor farmers,
the resource-rich farmers have the capability of sustaining the adverse effects of com-
petitive deepening. This is simply because the resource-rich farmers are not constrained to
the same extent as resource-poor farmers in mobilizing finance for well drilling or well
deepening activities.
Table 1 Distribution of wells across landholding size
Landholding
size (Ha)
No.
of
BW
No.
of
DW
No. of
DCBW
Total
wells
% of
wells
dried up
No.
of
BW
No.
of
DW
No. of
DCBW
Total
wells
% of
wells
dried up
Hosadurga Madhugiri
Marginal
(up to 1)
11 0 0 11 18.2 27 14 5 46 76.1
Small
(1.01–3)
52 3 0 55 29.1 168 41 36 245 78.8
Medium
(3.01–5)
58 4 0 62 41.9 49 17 3 69 65.2
Large (more
than 5)
99 4 1 104 51.9 28 6 4 38 50.0
Total 220 11 1 232 42.2 272 78 48 398 73.4
Source Primary survey
Percentage of dried wells represents all types of completely failed wells
BW Borewell, DW Dug well, DCBW Dug-cum-borewell
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However, the sole ownership is the indication of the property rights claimed over
groundwater. The operation of the law of inheritance has perpetuated the problem of sole
ownership of land. With the problem of fragmentation of land, every single farmer, who
can afford to drill borewell, is now enjoying the property rights over groundwater by
extracting substantial quantity of groundwater. In the event of competitiveness to bring
more area under irrigation, small and marginal farmers tend to have experimented with
drilling more wells even though they did not strike adequate quantity of groundwater.
Therefore, the area irrigated per well by small and marginal farmers is low when compared
with that by medium and large farmers (Table 2). For instance, both in Hosadurga and
Madhugiri, the area irrigated per well in the case of marginal farmers is less than 1 ha, and
in the case of small farmers, it is less than 1.5 ha. But in the case of large farmers, the area
irrigated per well is more than 2 ha in both the conditions. This is manly due to less
number of wells owned by small and marginal farmers with low depth affects the quantity
and could pump only 3–4 h in a day compared to large farmers who are having 4–6 bore
wells and pump simultaneously from 2 to 3 functioning wells using compressor pumps.
More number of wells necessarily resulted in increased costs to the farmers as reflected in
the cost of irrigation at farm level. Despite little variations in the area irrigated per well,
farmers tend to spend more money on wells in terms of capital costs as well as running
(labour and maintenance) costs.
3.2 Growth, depth and cost of borewells
Growth of groundwater structures (wells) is associated with many factors. Falling water
levels and competition among farmers have major implications for the growth of wells in
the study area. This has had a variety of impacts. First, there has been a change in the type
of wells. Traditional open wells/dug-cum-borewells could not be used when water levels
fell and new technologies for both wells and pumping proliferated in recent decades. Now,
large numbers of defunct open wells have turned into storage tanks in the wake of
infrequent power supply and voltage fluctuation.
Table 2 Ownership of wells across size class of landholding in Hosadurga and Madhugiri
Landholding size (Ha) Total number
of wells owned
Functioning
wells (%)
Total extent of land
irrigated (ha)
Average extent
irrigated area per
well (ha)a
Marginal farmer (N = 10) 11 81.8 5.58 0.62
Small farmer (N = 37) 55 70.9 44.08 1.13
Medium farmer (N = 26) 62 58.1 51.16 1.42
Large farmer (N = 29) 104 48.1 106.11 2.12
Hosadurga (N = 102) 232 57.8 206.93 1.54
Marginal farmer (N = 15) 46 23.9 6.99 0.64
Small farmer (N = 73) 245 21.2 73.43 1.41
Medium farmer (N = 22) 69 34.8 36.54 1.52
Large farmer (N = 13) 38 50.0 38.05 2.00
Madhugiri (N = 123) 398 26.6 155.01 1.46
Source Primary survey
a Average extent of irrigated area is calculated for functioning wells only, and this includes area irrigated
through water markets as well
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The growth of wells seems to be high in Madhugiri compared to Hosadurga (Table 3).
This uneven growth is because of frequent well failure problem. Since Madhugiri is
suffering from cumulative well interference problem, frequent well failure and declining
yield rate are quite obvious in this area. Similarly, the depth of borewells is increasing
constantly with the number of borewells both in Madhugiri and Hosadurga, but the severity
is high in Madhugiri. Table 3 reveals that the depth of borewells in Madhugiri is always
higher than that of Hosadurga. The difference is almost two times. This is a clear indication
of competitive extraction behaviour of farmers in Madhugiri.
Declining groundwater table, as well as availability of a variety of drilling technologies
have major implications on the cost of obtaining access to groundwater. The cost of
drilling borewells is much lower in Hosadurga compared to Madhugiri because water
tables are higher. Importantly, the water required by the crops is less in Hosadurga
compared to Madhugiri due to cropping pattern. This reduces the pressure on groundwater
resource and hence declining cost of drilling.
The problem of initial failure of wells also indicates the severity of groundwater
overexploitation in both the areas (Table 3). As the number of wells increases, the isolation
distance between wells decreases. For example, as farmers perceived, the isolation distance
between two borewells is ranging from 15 to 60 m in Madhugiri and 100 to 200 m in
Hosadurga. As a result, the cost of drilling increases considerably, especially in Madhugiri,
where isolation distance between wells decreases severely leading to problem of well
failure. Thus, the investment on additional well is increasing over time, and it is consid-
erably high in Madhugiri (Table 3). For instance, investment on additional well in Ho-
sadurga was Rs. 7,505 prior to well interference period, that is, 1985, while it was Rs.
Table 3 Details of borewells in Hosadurga and Madhugiri
Particulars Before
1985
During
1985–1990
During
1991–1995
During
1996–2000
During
2001–2007
Hosadurga
Total No. of borewells 8 12 36 80 84
Average depth (ft) 154 164 187 179 215
HP used 4.3 4.91 4.55 4.22 4.52
Initial failure of wells (per cent) 0 8.3 22.2 38.75 33.33
Investment on wells (Rs. in current
prices)
Drilling cost 7,022 9,338 8,671 8,968 10,890
Investment on additional well (Rs) 7,505 8,812 8,188 9,853 11,273
Madhugiri
Total No. of borewells 9 13 72 85 94
Average depth (ft) 281 404 373 383 490
HP used 8.1 8.5 8.5 9.5 9.5
Initial failure of wells (per cent) 11.11 0 22.22 30.58 26.59
Investment on wells (Rs in current prices)
Drilling cost 15,447 13,525 16,422 17,836 24,582
Investment on additional well (Rs) 11,595 22,856 17,775 18,775 26,114
Source Primary survey
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11,595 in Madhugiri during the same period. Gradually, investment on additional wells
started rising due to high rate of well failure because of the declining water table. Con-
sequently, the investment on additional wells is increasing sharply in Madhugiri (more than
two times during 2001–2007).
The major implication of cumulative well interference is the ever increasing cost. Our
survey results show that the cost incurred on well drilling by individual farmers is quite
high in Madhugiri as compared to Hosadurga. In particular, cost incurred on well drilling
looks quite disproportionate to landholding size (Table 4). For instance, the amount spent
per well located in the Madhugiri works out to Rs. 17,152 when compared to Rs. 9,624 in
Hosadurga. Further, the rate is disproportionate in the cost of drilling well as reflected in
terms of landholding size as well. The current average cost of drilling per well is highest
among small and marginal farmers in Madhugiri compared to their counterparts in Ho-
sadurga. This implies that the consequences of cumulative interference problem on access
to resource are severe in Madhugiri.
Falling water levels and competition among farmers have major implications for the
resource extraction technology that can be used. Changing technology for the extraction of
groundwater from deep aquifers and the use of high power motors has had huge impact on
energy demand. Until 1990s, manually lifting device, for example, yetha was the main
means of water extraction from the open wells. That is now not in practice due to change in
types of wells that can be used for irrigation in the wake of declining water tables. Dug-
cum-borewells were used for some time with low capacity (3.5 HP) pump sets. Later, with
the availability of borewell technology coupled with declining water tables, high horse-
power is being used in relation to depth.
Such steep rise in horsepower disturbed the balance between groundwater recharge and
extraction resulting in the decline of water levels in areas characterized by high well
density. A sharp decline in the water tables and their reduced thickness have resulted in
lower aquifer transmissibility. This implies that the rate of pumping should be reduced
significantly to stabilize the water tables. Unless proper measures to control over-pumping
Table 4 Cost of drilling per well across landholding size (at current prices)
Landholding
size (ha)
Hosadurga Madhugiri
Total No.
of farmers
Av.
depth
(ft)
Av. cost per
well (Rs.)
Av.
HP
Total No.
of farmers
Av.
depth
(ft)
Av. cost per
well (Rs.)
Av.
HP
Marginal
farmer
(up to 1)
10 197 10,978 (11) 4.3 15 490 21,583 (46) 10.3
Small farmer
(1.01–3.0)
37 192 9,392 (55) 4.4 73 426 22,723 (242) 8.9
Medium
farmer
(3.01–5.0)
26 186 9,125 (62) 4.7 22 360 19,220 (69) 9.2
Large farmer
(more than
5.0)
29 195 9,900 (104) 4.4 13 393 18,509 (38) 8.7
Total 102 192 9,624 (232) 4.5 123 417 21,573 (398) 9.1
Source: Primary survey
Figures in parentheses indicate number of wells (all types of wells)
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of the resources are undertaken in future, even with the same rate of pumping, the rate of
water table decline will be much faster. This observation corroborates with the findings of
earlier studies in the semi-arid areas (Janakarajan and Moench 2006).
However, declining water levels have encouraged increases in water use efficiency.
Until 1980s, open channels were used for conveying water from wells to the fields. Now,
the farmers often use underground pipelines and hose pipes. Overground storage tanks are
common in Madhugiri to store water due to low voltage power supply as well as frequent
power cut. Therefore, high well and equipment costs disproportionately affect small
farmers. While large farmers have the resources to survive unsuccessful investments in
well drilling and well deepening, for a small farmer, the losses are often unsustainable.
3.3 Incidence of well failures
The total number of wells distributed across villages is given in Table 5. It is revealed that
the total number of wells owned was more than one-and-a-half times for Madhugiri (398)
as compared to Hosadurga (232). It was observed that around 73 % of the wells
Table 5 Incidence of well failure across landholding size
Landholding
size (ha)
Borewells Open
wells
Completely
failed
borewells
Completely
failed open
wellsa
Total
failed
wells
Total wells
functioning
Total
number
of wells
Marginal
farmer
(up to 1)
11 (100) 0 (0.0) 2 (18.2) 0 2 (18.2) 9 (81.8) 11
Small farmer
(1.01–3.0)
52 (94.5) 3 (5.5) 13 (25.0) 3 16 (29.1) 39 (70.9) 55
Medium
farmer
(3.01–5.0)
58 (93.5) 4 (6.5) 22 (37.9) 4 26 (41.9) 36 (58.1) 62
Large farmer
(More than
5.0)
99 (95.2) 5 (4.8) 50 (50.5) 5 55 (52.9) 49 (47.1) 104
Hosadurga 220 (94.8) 12 (5.2) 87 (39.5) 12 99 (42.7) 133 (57.3) 232
Marginal
farmer
(up to 1)
27 (58.7) 19 (41.3) 17 (63.0) 19 36 (78.3) 10 (21.7) 46
Small farmer
(1.01–3.0)
168 (68.6) 77 (31.4) 116 (69.0) 77 193 (78.8) 52 (21.2) 245
Medium
farmer
(3.01–5.0)
49 (71.0) 20 (29.0) 25 (51.0) 20 45 (65.2) 24 (34.8) 69
Large farmer
(More than
5.0)
28 (73.7) 10 (26.3) 9 (32.1) 10 19 (50.0) 19 (50.0) 38
Madhugiri 272 (68.3) 126 (31.7) 167 (61.4) 126 293 (73.6) 105 (26.4) 398
Figures in parentheses in columns 2, 3, 6 and 7 indicate percentage to total wells, in column 4 indicate
percentages to total number of borewells
Source Primary survey
a All the open wells and dug-cum-borewells have failed in the study area; hence, we have considered them
as open wells for general understanding
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(borewells ? open wells) had failed in Madhugiri, whereas in the Hosadurga, the pro-
portion of total failed wells was around 42 %. Among the total failed wells, the rate of
failure was high in the case of borewells compared to open wells. For instance, in Mad-
hugiri, around 61 % of failed wells belonged to borewell category. Similarly, in Hosad-
urga, the proportion of completely failed borewells to total borewells was about 40 %. On
the other hand, all the open wells and dug-cum-borewells have become defunct in both the
areas due to cumulative well interference problem.
In Hosadurga, the proportion of still functioning wells is around 58 % compared to
26.4 % in Madhugiri. This negative externality could link with social and economic
condition of the rural agrarian livelihood system. The most visible implications of well
failure problem are increasing cost on additional wells, cost on well deepening, reduction
in area per well and loss of gross and net income from agriculture. Considering the well
failure due to well interference and their impact in the Madhugiri, the burden of open well
falls equally on both small and large farmers, as more than 50 % of the failed wells in both
categories of wells were owned by small farmers. Hence, the concern towards the small
and marginal farmers due to interference of negative externality is substantiated in the
situation where interference is apparent. In addition, the ability of small farmers in bearing
the brunt of well failure is limited by the size of their holding, savings, re-investment and
economic resilience potentials.
3.4 Access to groundwater irrigation
The data regarding physical access to groundwater revealed that the large farmers were
better off compared to small farmers because they could invest in additional wells and
deepen existing wells. The proportion of functioning wells in the study area followed a
positive association with the size of the landholding (Table 6). As size of landholding
increased the proportion of functioning wells also increased indicating that access to
resource was determined by the land-ownership. Besides, water extracted per functioning
well was also proportionate to the size of landholding. In the hard rock areas, due to the
rapidly depleting groundwater resource, the proportion of functioning wells also declining
constantly. This also explains the density of wells. It is important to note that the wells per
farm were high in the case of small and marginal farmers compared to medium and large
farmers in both the areas (Table 6). It implies that the small and marginal farmers were
new to the resource extraction activity. Thus, the number of wells owned by them was
Table 6 Access to groundwater resource by farmers in the study area
Particulars Hosadurga Madhugiri
MF SF MDF LF MF SF MDF LF
Proportion of functional wells 49.5 75.0 62.1 81.8 40.7 30.4 49.0 67.9
Wells per farm 1.97 1.17 1.13 0.93 3.86 2.31 1.34 0.73
Functional wells per farm 0.46 0.88 0.70 0.85 0.49 0.70 0.65 0.57
Annual irrigation cost per acre (Rs) 3,527 2,300 1,189 1,648 11,357 6,074 4,796 4,530
Water extracted per functional well
(acre-inch)
16.0 77.5 50.7 67.6 57.4 82.5 48.8 110.8
Number of failed wells per functioning
well
1.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.5 2.3 1.0 0.5
MF marginal farmers, SF small farmers, MDF medium farmers, LF large farmers
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high, but the functioning wells were less because of water scarcity. Large farmers could
deepen the wells so they had a higher number of functioning wells compared to the small
farmers. This was obvious, given the resource capability of these farmers. The larger
number of wells per farm in Madhugiri reflected the intensity of competitiveness among
different farmers as a result of resource scarcity. It motivated even small farmers to sink
more wells. More often than not, a majority of these wells failed while the remaining wells
yielded less water. Thus, to sustain crops and to continue with agriculture, the farmers
either deepened existing wells or sunk new wells.
The results indicate that the annual irrigation cost per acre was higher for marginal (Rs.
3,527 and Rs. 11,357) and small farmers (Rs. 2,300 and Rs. 6,074) than the medium (Rs.
1,189 and Rs. 4,796) and large farmers (Rs. 1,648 and Rs. 4,530) in Hosadurga and
Madhugiri, respectively (Table 6). Importantly, the operation and maintenance cost was
the major component in the annual irrigation cost of irrigation wells. The irregular supply
of power and deeper aquifers resulted in frequent burning of motors and pumps. More
often, small and marginal farmers, due to financial crisis, purchased low-quality acces-
sories that were vulnerable to irregular power supply. Therefore, the repair and mainte-
nance cost was huge for small and marginal farmers.
The water yield and the area irrigated by these wells varied between villages that were
affected by severe well interference problem and those that were not. For instance, in
Hosadurga, nearly 37 % of the wells were irrigating a gross area of more than 4 ha
compared to 25.4 % of the wells irrigating the same area in Madhugiri. Similarly, less than
15 % of the wells were irrigating more than 2 ha of net irrigated area in both Hosadurga
and Madhugiri. This implies that the gross irrigated area (GIA) and net irrigated area (NIA)
of Hosadurga was high due to resource availability coupled with landholding size and
cropping pattern. However, in Madhugiri, the area irrigated per well (both GIA and NIA)
was low due to low yield of wells and fragmented landholdings.
There was a positive relation between water extracted per functioning well and func-
tional wells per farm in both areas. It indicates that higher the functioning well per farm,
higher the water extraction. Since medium and large farmers owned more functional wells
and had large landholdings, the water extraction per well was higher compared to marginal
and small farmers. Similarly, the wells owned by small and marginal farmers did not get
sustainable yield. They were shallow and located in areas where cumulative well inter-
ference was a severe problem. This had a critical link with the rural livelihood systems
because a majority of the people directly or indirectly depended on groundwater for
subsistence. Any change in the supply of this critical resource had an overwhelming effect
on the society.
Table 7 Physical access to
groundwater resource in the
study area
* Significant at 1 % level
Dependent variable = groundwater used per acre of gross irrigated
area (acre-inches)
Variables Coefficients t statistics
Intercept 2.41 0.87
Well depth (ft) 0.787* 4.64
Well yield (gallon per hour) 1.07* 3.37
Cost per acre-inch (Rs.) -0.356* -8.21
R2 = 0.39
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From the regression analysis, it has been found that well yield had a positive influence
on volume of groundwater used, while the cost of groundwater exerted a negative influence
(Table 7). The results show that for 1 per cent increase in groundwater yield per well, the
groundwater used per acre increased by 1.07 %. For 1 per cent increase in cost of
groundwater, the groundwater used declined by 0.35 %, and for 1 per cent increase in the
well depth, the groundwater used increased by 0.78 %. The significant positive sign of the
well depth indicates that the groundwater use was increasing. This indicates that there is an
economic rationale for deepening of wells. But, not all farmers could afford it due to
resource constraints. However, caution needs to be exercised while interpreting the results.
The result indicated may not be a feasible solution for physical access to groundwater in
the study area where aquifers are fast depleting leading to resource exhaustion. In such
case, deeper wells may lead to well failure and deterioration in the economic condition of
the household. This has a negative impact on household income, which is directly related
to groundwater used on the farm to stabilize productivity. Therefore, it is predicted that
resource replenishment would enhance the physical access to groundwater, which in turn
would enhance the household living condition by allowing farmers to stabilize the
productivity.
Although the physical access to groundwater is determined by the depth of the well, its
yield and the cost of groundwater, the economic access to groundwater is the major focal
point in resource extraction and utilization in agriculture development. Economic access
provides an opportunity to enhance farm productivity by minimizing the cost of extraction.
Economic access to groundwater decreased with the yield of the well and gross irrigated
area but increased with depth of the well. This indicates that 1 per cent increase in the
depth of the well increased economic access to groundwater by 0.74 %. However, as
expected, the 1 per cent increase in yield and gross irrigated area decreased economic
access to groundwater by 1.76 and 0.71 %, respectively (Table 8). This suggests that
increasing the depth of wells has a direct relation with increasing the cost of groundwater.
This will ultimately have negative effects on the sustainability of the resource and farmers’
welfare in this region.
3.5 Cost and returns from groundwater irrigation
A comparison of the annual cost and returns from groundwater irrigation indicates that
irrigation cost contributes to the major difference in the cost of cultivation, which is higher,
by 54 %, in Madhugiri than Hosadurga (Table 9). The rise in the annual irrigation cost is a
partial indicator of scarcity of groundwater in Madhugiri. As indicated elsewhere, the
major portion of irrigation cost is incurred on rising repair and maintenance works. During
our field visit, it was learnt that many farmers complained about frequent burning of
Table 8 Economic access to
groundwater
Dependent variable = natural
logarithm of (1/cost per acre-inch
of water)
* Significant at 1 per cent level
Dependent variable: cost of groundwater (Rs./acre-inch)
Variable Coefficient t statistics
Intercept 5.91* 4.29
Depth (feet) 0.74* 3.19
Yield (gallons per hour) -1.76* -4.12
Gross irrigated area (acre) -0.71 -9.24
R2 = 0.496
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motors due to low voltage and fluctuation in power supply. This results in higher annual
repair and maintenance costs on the farm. Due to rising irrigation cost, the net income is
negative in both the areas, but Hosadurga is marginally better off compared to Madhugiri.
Although the gross income per well and per acre in Madhugiri and Hosadurga are com-
parable, considerable differences exist in terms of net income.
The disaggregate picture demonstrates that the volume of water per acre was 16 %
higher in Madhugiri. Similarly, all other costs (labour costs, fertilizer costs and other costs)
were higher in Madhugiri. This clearly indicates that the irrigated agriculture in Madhugiri
suffered from severe overdraft compared to Hosadurga. The cultivation of perennial crops,
like coconut, in Hosadurga was a coping mechanism contributing to reasonable use of
inputs such as groundwater resource. Therefore, the ideal solution would be to augment
supply of groundwater and diversify the cropping pattern into low water-intensive crops.
Hence, improvement in the resource base supports the increasing demand for groundwater.
The statistical significance of the benefits of groundwater irrigation has been estimated
by comparing the means with regard to major indicators between small and large farmers
in Hosadurga and Madhugiri. The results indicate that there was considerable difference in
the total quantity of groundwater used on the farm in the two areas (Table 10). In Ho-
sadurga, the groundwater used on the farm by marginal and small farmers together was
68.53 acre-inches and 93.44 acre-inches by large farmers. Similar difference was observed
in Madhugiri. A comparison of the total groundwater used in both areas shows that
Madhugiri used more than Hosadurga. It was obvious because Madhugiri was dominated
by short-term food crops that are hydrophilic. In terms of net returns per farm as well as per
acre of GIA, small and large farmers were in a comfortable position in Madhugiri when
compared to their counterparts in Hosadurga. For instance, the net return per farm as well
as per acre of GIA was negative (Rs. -6,212 per farm and Rs. -1,120 per acre of GIA) in
the case of small and marginal farmers in Hosadurga. However, the same category of
farmers operated in the comfort zone because they earned Rs. 1,300 and Rs. 792 per farm
as well as per acre of GIA, respectively. The cost of groundwater per acre-inch
Table 9 Annual cost and returns from well irrigation per farm
Particulars Hosadurga Madhugiri
Per well Per acre Per well Per acre
Volume of water extracted from well (m3) 5,992 1,919 7,039 2,231
Volume of water extracted from well (AI) 58.3 18.7 68.5 21.7
Human ? bullock labour (Rs.) 6,691 (23) 2,143 8,150 (20) 2,584
Fertiliser cost (Rs.) 7,028 (24) 2,251 7,462 (18) 2,365
Other variable cost (Rs.) 521 (2) 167 2,699 (7) 855
Opportunity cost of capital at 9 per centa 1,282 (4) 410 1,648 (4) 522
Irrigation cost (Rs.) 13,851 (47) 901 21,410 (52) 1,784
Total cost (Rs.) 29,373 (100) 5,872 41,369 (100) 8,110
Gross income (Rs.) 29,331 9,394 33,037 10,474
Net income (Rs.) -42 3,522 -8,332 2,364
Figures in parentheses indicate percentage to the total cost
One acre-inch (AI) = 102.79 m3
a Interest rate during the fourth quarter of 2007 was considered to indicate the realistic opportunity cost of
capital as field work was carried out during this time
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corresponded with the water used in both the areas. The average cost per acre-inch of water
was nearly one-and-a-half times higher for small farmers in Hosadurga, whereas in
Madhugiri, this amount was in the reverse order. This implies that the large farmers had
higher gross irrigated area as demonstrated earlier which consumed more water, hence high
cost per acre-inch of water. The results are statistically significant except for net return per
farm and per acre of GIA signifying that there was a need for improving efficiency in the
use of the resource in irrigated agriculture.
3.6 Negative externality cost
The negative externality cost was increasing due to the rapidly declining average age and
life of wells in the hard rock areas. Thus, the increasing rate of well failure resulted in
investment in coping mechanisms to secure a sustainable yield. The rising negative
externality cost due to overexploitation indicated that the physical scarcity of groundwater
in terms of decreased water yield from the wells and economic scarcity in terms of rising
irrigation cost per acre-inch was evident in Madhugiri.
The negative externality in terms of failed wells in hard rock areas increased over time
(Chandrakanth and Arun 1997; Shivakumaraswamy and Chandrakanth 1997; Nagaraj et al.
2003). In Hosadurga, the proportion of failed wells increased with landholding size
(Table 11). In the case of Madhugiri, the proportion of failed wells showed a mixed
pattern. Since the proportion of failed wells was increasing, the capital investment on these
wells was net loss to the farmers. Thus, the total amount of negative externality in these
Table 10 Statistical significance of groundwater benefits
Particulars Mean SD t value
Marginal and
small farmers
Large
farmers
Marginal and
small farmers
Large
farmers
Hosadurga
Total water used on the
farm (acre-inch)
68.53 93.44 90.95 78.50 9.74*
Net return per farm (Rs.) -6,212 941.2 14,481 30,703 -0.846
Net return per acre of
GIA (Rs.)
-1,120 519.9 783.9 5,349.6 -0.359
Net return per acre-inch of
water (Rs.)
69.10 83.7 455.7 355.9 1.930***
Cost per acre-inch of
water (Rs.)
644 461.84 686 765.99 7.50*
Madhugiri
Total water used on the
farm (acre-inch)
74.36 99.22 72.49 103.31 9.45*
Net return per farm (Rs.) 1,300.97 2,380.48 32,330 25,279 0.587
Net return per acre of
GIA (Rs.)
792.92 2,141.26 12,950 12,569 1.01
Net return per acre-inch of
water (Rs.)
167.78 273.08 784.85 1,153.52 2.43**
Cost per acre-inch of
water (Rs.)
939.37 1,197.86 1,448.66 2,569.10 5.243*
*, ** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level
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two areas was increasing. However, the total negative externality cost in Madhugiri was
more than three times higher than in Hosadurga. The large gap in terms of negative
externality cost of groundwater overexploitation between Hosadurga and Madhugiri was
due to physical as well as economic scarcity of groundwater resources. The total negative
externality cost for the sample farmers was colossal, Rs. 8,35,260 in Madhugiri and Rs.
2,97,943 in Hosadurga (Table 10). The negative externality cost per farm was as high as
Rs. 6,791 in Madhugiri and Rs. 2,921 in Hosadurga. These results were supported by the
findings of Chandrakanth and Arun (1997) and Nagaraj et al. (2003).
The total negative externality cost for farmers varied from Rs. 536.9 for marginal
farmers to Rs. 1,59,407 for large farmers in Hosadurga, while the amount was higher with
variations in Madhugiri (Table 11). Similarly, the negative externality per acre of gross
irrigated area was also similar in Hosadurga. Small farmers were suffering the most in
Madhugiri. This paradoxical situation was clearly explained by the comparatively higher
yield of borewells in Hosadurga, which reduced the negative externality cost. The
increasing negative externality cost in the study area was due to scarcity caused by the
problem of cumulative well interference. The farmers failed to include negative externality
as a cost, while taking the decision on the proportion of groundwater to be used for
irrigation and the investment on well improvement or on new wells because they tend to be
myopic and do not take long-term effects into consideration.
Since all externalities associated with private exploitation arise primarily because losers
find it impossible to extract suitable compensation from the emitters of the externalities
under the existing structure of property rights, public control over water resources by a well
informed and just authority will result in effective elimination. The proposed spacing
regulations tend to exclude the late comers and create and strengthen the monopoly of
existing owners. In other words, spacing regulations single out the poor to bear the cost of
maintaining the ecological balance. Therefore, acceptable interventions by the government
to augment supply of water and its management could solve the inequity that persists in
groundwater extraction.
In India, groundwater is regulated through supply regulation of electricity rather than
fixing the electricity charges appropriately. Though it has helped in checking the over-
exploitation in the short run, it is not an efficient solution in the long run (Reddy 2005).
Therefore, economic pricing of electricity with proper monitoring facilities would be more
appropriate in order to internalize these externalities. The other way of minimizing these
externalities is to strengthen the resource base, that is, replenishing groundwater through
water harvesting. Since both Madhugiri and Hosadurga are well connected with surface
water bodies such as irrigation tanks, the integration of these sources with groundwater
development perhaps is a potential solution for sustainable water resource management in
these areas. The benefits of such integration would be enormous when compared with the
losses due to depletion, and hence, it makes economic and ecological sense. Therefore,
state has to take major responsibility while community participation in terms of cost-
sharing and management of resource is a must for sustainability. This creates sense of
ownership among the community.
Groundwater overexploitation is also attributed to the cultivation of water-intensive
commercial crops on a large scale. Hence, there is a need for a benevolent cropping pattern
which consumes less water. The author’s experience indicates that there are voluntary
initiatives by farmers to shift cropping pattern to less water-intensive tree crops such as
mango and other fruits orchards. These farmers need to be motivated with appropriate
incentives to strengthen their economic condition. Incentives for farmers on resource
utilization should be linked to the use of water-saving technologies (e.g., drip/sprinkler)
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and water conservation (e.g., farm ponds/rainwater harvesting structures) mechanisms.
This type of collective community management of groundwater resource will improve
equity in access to water and sustainability of the resource.
Besides, attention needs to be paid to the linkages between long-term groundwater
management issues and short-term coping mechanisms. In this direction, government
should promote the community managed aquifer recharge strategy developed by Andhra
Pradesh Farmer Managed Groundwater Systems Project (2006). Under this strategy,
institutions involving farmers play a key role in aquifer recharge as well as in reversing the
target of declining water levels. Further, the problem of inequity existing in well irrigation
could possibly be addressed by promoting group investments in well irrigation where
sharing the cost and benefits among the farmers is crucial. The group investment on well
irrigation could probably solve the problem of overexploitation of groundwater, hence
minimizing the negative externality. The social regulation over groundwater use is nec-
essary to counteract overexploitation which minimizes the pressure on groundwater
resource.
4 Conclusions
The current situation has occurred mostly due to the problem of cumulative well inter-
ference, which induces rapid decline in the water table in view of heavy drawdown in hard
rock areas. The comparison of ‘high’ and ‘low’ well interference areas confirms the fact
that the cost of irrigation is the major difference in the cost of cultivation which is higher
by 54 % in Madhugiri compared to Hosadurga. The rise in the annual cost of irrigation is a
partial indicator of scarcity of groundwater in Madhugiri.
The econometric results indicate that the depth of the well enhances the physical access
to groundwater, while that of economic access suffers. Therefore, the feasible solution
would be to augment supply by taking recharge measures, which would enhance the
resource base and balance demand and supply of groundwater. The negative externality
cost of groundwater depletion and water use efficiency suggests that the low water-
intensive crops and micro-irrigation systems would be better coping mechanisms to
enhance efficiency and reduce negative externality costs. Since these mechanisms augment
supply of groundwater, the pressure on this resource can be reduced to some extent.
Therefore, farmers need to be educated on water conservation strategies to overcome the
negative externalities of groundwater depletion.
The analysis clearly indicates the need for supply and demand side interventions. In
hard rock areas, the low rainfall and limited supply of surface water sources are the major
causes for the current level of groundwater exploitation. Therefore, the objective of the
public policy should be to maximize equity in access to the resource where it is plentiful
and to minimize adverse ecological effects in area under stress with minimum damage to
the interests of the resource-poor.
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